

~~SECRET~~

16 17

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICYOFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

0 1 OCT 1981

In Reply Refer to:
1-24282/81

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Bahr Visit to DoD (U)

(U) On 24 September a parliamentary group led by Egon Bahr, SPD, Chairman of the Arms Control Subcommittee of the Bundestag, visited the Pentagon to meet with Assistant Secretary Perle and to receive a DIA briefing on the Soviet threat facing NATO.

(S) Mr. Bahr began by requesting that Mr. Perle describe the Administration's intentions and plans with respect to TNF. Mr. Perle responded that talks on TNF arms control would begin on 30 November, following a lengthy and thorough process of preparation. This Administration had particularly sought to prevent a reoccurrence of the March 1977 experience of the Carter Administration's inadequate preparation for its initial negotiations with the Soviets on SALT. Now, however, the impact of TNF on the military balance has been thoroughly studied in NATO and a careful analysis of our needs developed. The Administration had affirmed very early on its support for the NATO dual-track approach and the development of an Alliance-wide product in implementing that approach has required considerable time. The German contribution to the HLG's two completed papers has been exemplary and much welcomed by us. Nonetheless, the task we face as we begin negotiations is to overcome the difficult negotiating position of having only planned deployments beginning in December 1983 compared to the Soviet forces that are already deployed. The SS-20 thus remains the central focus of our concern with 250 missiles in place with a total of 750 warheads on launchers and at least one refire missile per launcher exists. The Soviets have demonstrated in exercises the capability to relaunch in 30 to 40 minutes. Mobility of the missile of course makes refires possible and, with its 4,000 - 5,000 KM range allows all but a small number of the total launchers to deliver missiles against the high priority targets in Europe. In contrast to the SS-4s and 5s, the SS-20s are extremely difficult to target, relatively invulnerable, rapid-to-launch, and highly accurate. Because the SS-20 is both ready for near instantaneous launch and possesses high accuracy it provides a capability for a Soviet preemptive attack.

(C) The LRTNF modernization furnished by Pershing II and GLCM is intended to enhance the survivability of our theater nuclear deterrent. The NATO strategy of deterring, deterring attack as far forward as possible, and deterring extensive use of nuclear weapons if deterrence fails ultimately, is linked to the US strategic deterrent. Thus the US does not aim at fielding equal numbers of GLCM/PII with SS-20's, but now that NATO's superiority in nuclear weapons has gone, NATO must provide systems that deter the Soviets at all levels.

OSD review completed

Classified by: Dir, EUR & NATO Policy
Declassify by: 1 October 1987~~SECRET~~

SEC DEF CONTR No.

26/EUR
X16447
C10/12

~~SECRET~~

2

(C) In response to the questions Mr. Perle allowed that West Berlin's security ultimately relied on global deterrence rather than on any theater capability that exists now but that an unbroken set of links in the deterrence chain was required. Also to those who questioned US resolve to defend Europe, Mr. Perle noted the Alliance pledge is to treat an attack on one as an attack on all. While the risks are unprecedented, an attack by the Soviets that was not contained by conventional forces might result in nuclear weapons use and the impossibility of separating US nuclear forces in Europe from those based in the U.S. The link is a vital one and is sustained by evidence of allied willingness to sacrifice by supporting the common defense with personal energy and increased real defense expenditures in difficult times. The willingness of the United States to defend Europe is not eroded by demonstrators or terrorists who we know do not represent the vast majority that supports NATO and our presence in Europe.

(S) Returning to the subject of TNF negotiations, Perle said there were two issues which would be important in the US negotiating effort. First, it will be necessary in an agreement to deal with refires. As indicated in his earlier remarks, refire potential on systems like the SS-20 provide a major multiplier effect on Soviet military capacity. An agreement that even reduced launchers but left refire missiles unconstrained would leave the military threat to Europe largely unaffected.

(S) Second, while the SS-20 will be an important focus of our negotiating effort, we cannot ignore missile systems of shorter range - like the SS-22 and SS-X-23 - which from forward positions could largely substitute for the target coverage provided by the long range SS-20, SS-4's, and SS-5's. Perle said he would assume that these shorter-range systems would be a matter of particular concern to the Federal Republic, whose territory could be fully covered by these systems. Bahr, with expressions of agreement from others in his group, said the shorter range systems had long been a matter of concern to him and agreed fully with Perle that they must be covered in an agreement.

(U) Bahr and other members of the German group expressed appreciation for the meeting, and Perle said he hoped it would be possible to meet again and spend more time discussing these critical issues.

(C) Following the meeting with Mr. Perle, the German delegation went to the DIA Conference room and was joined by the FRG Ambassador Hermes. The group received a DIA briefing on the "Soviet threat to NATO" which included a comprehensive survey of types of weapons oriented toward NATO. The German delegation appeared interested in the briefing, which was offered at the Secret level of classification. The Germans repeatedly requested that photos of the SS-20 be shown and were repeatedly refused. Mr. Bader explained that illustrations of the SS-20 would be made available shortly by SecDef but that intelligence-gathering requirements severely limited the display of photographs.



George W. Bader

Prepared by: Cassidy/Woodworth

~~SECRET~~